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MILLS v. MILLS: IS CONSTRUCTION OF
PRIOR JUDGMENTS A PROPER SUBJECT
FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF?
Laurence R. Sherfy
Since the adoption of the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act& in
1934, and the various state acts, many questions have arisen concern-
ing the use of the declaratory judgment. Among the most persistent
of these questions are the effect of a declaratory judgment action on
the burden of proof, the right to -a jury trial in a declaratory judgment
action, and whether a prior judgment is a proper subject for declara-
tory relief. The third question is the concern of this note.
It is fair to say that both the federal and state2 declaratory judg-
ment aots were promulgated for basioally the same purposes: to re-
solve controversies before coercive relief became necessary or avail-
able; to provide an alternative to coercive relief; to permit party
switching; and to remove parties from peril and insecurity. Thus, par-
ties were allowed standing where they previously had none-where
their rights were only threatened, but not yet infringed. Parties who
formerly had to wait to be sued could now bring suit, and instead of
being forced to ask for coercive relief, a party had the alternative of
asking for a mere declaration of rights where this would best serve his
interests.
The question of whether a prior judgment is a proper subject for
declaratory relief, while posing somewhat of a problem, has caused
much more than its share of trouble. In answering this question courts
have frequently come to results inconsistent with the purpose behind
the declaratory judgment aots. With its recent decision in Mills v.
Mills,3 the Oklahoma Supreme Court aligned Oklahoma with those
states which exclude prior judgments from the scope of their declara-
1. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2202 (1964).
2. While the state acts do differ, most states enacted the Uniform Declaratory
Judgments Act, in some instances with minor variations.
3. 512 P.2d 143 (Okla. 1973).
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tory judgment acts. In doing so the court failed to recognize an ideal
situation in which to use the Olahoma version of the Uniform Dec-
laratory Judgments Act.4
Initially, the Act's use for the purpose of construing prior final
judgments went almost unquestioned. Early treatises5 and cases0 as-
sumed without discussion that declaratory relief was available for con-
struing prior judgments. Indeed, even Professor Edwin Borchard, a
co-draftsman of the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act and the fed-
eral act saw no need to justify his conclusion that "where the judg-
ment has become the source of rights but is unclear or ambiguous,
there seems no reason to deny the possibility of its interpretation by
declaratory judgment."' 7  This early acceptance of the propriety of the
procedure seemed premised on the commonsense view that if a genu-
ine controversy arises ,as to the legal effect of a judgment," declaratory
relief should be available. Such relief would serve to clarify the par-
ties' rights and duties under the decree and remove them from the
peril of a contempt proceeding for noncompliance.
However, some subsequent decisions did not accept prior judg-
ment construction as being within the realm of declaratory relief.
These later cases generally took the position that to allow prior judg-
ment construction by means of the declaratory judgment would make
unwarranted inroads into principles of res judicata. Additionally, the
earlier oases and treatises which had accepted prior judgment construc-
4. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1651 (1971). "District and Superior Courts may, in
cases of actual controversy, determine rights, status, or other legal relations, including
but not limited to a determination of the construction or validity of any deed, con-
tract, trust, or other instrument or agreement or of any statute, municipal ordinance,
or other governmental regulation, whether or not other relief is or could be claimed,
except that no such declaration shall be made concerning liability or nonliability for
damages on account of alleged tortious injuries to persons or to property either before
or after judgment or for compensation alleged to be due under workmen's compensation
laws for injuries to persons or concerning obligations alleged to arise under policies of
insurance covering liability or indemnity against liability for such injuries. The de-
termination may be made either before or after there has been a breach of any
legal duty or obligation, and it may be either affirmative or negative in form and
effect; provided however, that a court may refuse to make such determination where
the judgment, if rendered, would not terminate the controversy or some part thereof,
giving rise to the proceeding." (emphasis supplied).
5. W. ANDERSON, AcTIoNs FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS § 202, at 600 (1st
ed. 1940); E. BoRcHARD, DECLAR&TORY JUDGMENTS 181 (1st ed. 1934).
6. Lloyd v. Weir, 116 Conn. 201, 164 A. 386 (1933); Burnham v. Bennett,
141 Misc. 514, 252 N.Y.S. 788 (Sup. Ct. 1931).
7. E. BORCHARD, supra note 5, at 181.
8. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Martin, 108 F.2d 824 (8th Cir. 1940).
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tion as proper did not provide a reasoned basis for this conclusion,9
and did not, therefore, provide later courts with arguments supporting
such a procedure. These two factors may partially explain the refusal
of some courts to utilize the declaratory judgment in this manner. At
any rate, a few of the jurisdictions which have more recently decided
the issue have denied declaratory relief,10 and Oklahoma is among
them.
The facts in the Mills case are typical of many of the cases in
which problems with prior judgment construction arise. In 1952, the
plaintiff wife and defendant husband were divorced. Incorporated
into the divorce decree was an executed contract settlement covering
real and personal property. Eventually, a dispute arose between
plaintiff and defendant as to their respective rights in a piece of prop-
erty, which had been covered in the original decree, but in which the
ownership interest was unclear due to either an insufficiency in the
initial decree or events subsequent thereto, or a combination of both.
The part of the incorporated contract pertinent to the issue stated,
[Husband] shall pay over to [wife] one-half of the net rents
and income from the said property as said rents and income is
collected and received, and in the event [husband] shall sell
the said property, at any time from and after this date, [wife]
shall be entitled to receive one-third of the net proceeds of
the sale thereof. 1
From the date of the initial divorce decree until the time of the present
action the husband leased the property to the same lessee with the
maximum rental paid being $442.00 per month. In 1965, this lease
on the piece of property expired and the husband entered into new
agreements, not only for the piece of property covered in the decree,
but also for the two adjoining pieces of property which he had ac-
quired during the intervening period. The rental for all these lots
was $2400.00 for the first two months, and $1000.00 per month there-
after. Of these proceeds the husband allocated $400 per month at
all times -to the lot covered by the decree. At this point a dispute
arose between plaintiff wife and defendant husband as to their respec-
tive rights in the piece of property covered in the divorce decree. The
9. Id.; Murrell v. Stock Growers' Nat'l Bank, 74 F.2d 827 (10th Cir. 1934);
Burnham v. Bennett, 141 Misc. 514, 252 N.Y.S. 788 (Sup. Ct. 1931).
10. Illinois Power Co. v. Miller, 11 Ill. App. 2d 296, 137 N.E.2d 78 (1956);
Speaker v. Lawler, 463 S.W.2d 741 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971). But see Lower Colorado
River Authority v. McIntyre, 494 S.W.2d 219 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973); Crofts v,
Crofts, 21 Utah 2d 332, 445 P.2d 701 (1968).
11. 512 P.2d at 152 (dissenting opinion),
1974]
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allegation in plaintiff's petition stated,
[That under the parties' aforementioned contract and di-
vorce decree she was vested with an undivided one-third in-
terest in the fee of the subject property . . . 'together with
a vested incorporeal property right to one-half ( ) of the
net rents and income from said land . . . . That -the said
.. .described property and the right to one-half ( ) of
the net rents and income therefrom as provided in said prop-
erty settlement agreement and divorce decree were intended
and are estates and incorporeal property interests owned by
the plaintiff which are transferable by her during her life-
time or devisable by will .... ,12
Defendant denied the averments in plaintiff's petition and asserted that
plaintiff had no vested interest in the subject property and was entitled
to one-third of the net proceeds from the sale of the property only
in the event that plaintiff was alive at the ,time of the sale. Defendant
further asserted that the interests of plaintiff in the property were
mere personal rights enduring only for her lifetime, and were not
transferable, either voluntarily or by operation of law.
Plaintiff prayed for a judgment determining her to be the owner,
as a tenant in common with defendant, of a vested one-third interest
in the fee of the property."3 Both parties agreed that what the wife
sought, in addition to other things, was a declaratory judgment as to
her property rights under the divorce decree. 4
On these facts, the court held, over a dissent, "Oklahoma's Dec-
laratory Judgment Act. . .may not be used to interpret or determine
rights fixed by a final decree of a court of competent jurisdiction."'1
In reaching this conclusion, the majority erroneously based its reason-
ing on its characterization of the relief sought by the plaintiff. The
court stated,
We believe, after a careful weighing of the record, that
much of what the Appellee Wife really sought by her action
was in the nature of -appellate relief or a second trial of iden-
tical issues--previously adjudicated by the decree of di-
vorce.
16
To support the conclusion that a declaratory judgment cannot be used
to construe a previous decision, the court relied on two cases, Crofts
12. Id. at 153.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 146.
15. Id. at 148.
16. Id. at 147.
[Vol. 10:281
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v. Crofts'17 and Alabama Public Service Commission v. AAA Motor
Lines, Inc.'s From the Crofts case the majority took the following
quotation: "[he finality of a judgment must be respected in order
to insure the rights of parties."' 9 Authority taken from the Alabama
Public Service Commission case was as follows,
An action for declaratory judgment cannot be made a substi-
tute for appeal; if the rule were otherwise, a declaratory pro-
ceeding would lie to determine whether a prior declaratory
proceeding was erroneous, and there would be no end to
that kind of litigation.20
Once the court decided that what the plaintiff wanted was an appeal,
the case should have been disposed of on that basis and not with the
broad language of the opinion. While the decision states that the wife
was attempting to use the declaratory judgment statute as a prohibited
method of appeal, the language of the holding is so broad that it pre-
cludes any possibility of the use of declaratory judgments for the con-
struction and interpretation of any prior judgment, a result which goes
beyond the facts as found by the court.
The court feared that permitting declaratory judgments to con-
strue previous decisions would be tantamount to permitting collateral
attack on final judgments. This fear seems illusory. A court would
not be determining whether the prior action was erroneous, which, of
course, would be forbidden, but merely what the prior action had
said.21  Subsequent events may render ambiguous the rights and du-
ties determined by a judgment and when the prior judgment becomes
inadequate to a novel situation there is good reason to allow a declara-
tory judgment to clarify -the matter. The initial case would still be
res judicata as to the rights it determined, 22 and the declaratory judg-
ment would be res judicata as to the construction it placed on the prior
judgment. If the court did change its former decision by means of
the construction it placed on the decision, then the court would be
at fault in its application of the declaratory judgment act. Surely par-
ties needing relief should not be denied it merely because of a possi-
17. 21 Utah 2d 332, 445 P.2d 701 (1968).
18. 272 Ala. 362, 131 So. 2d 172, cert. denied 368 U.S. 896 (1961).
19. 21 Utah 2d at 333, 445 P.2d at 702.
20. 272 Ala. at 367, 131 So. 2d at 177.
21. No citation of authority is needed to support the proposition that courts so in-
terpret the effect and meaning of prior judgments every day in actions non-declaratory
in nature.
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bility that a court might use the declaratory judgment act erroneously.
The dissent's reasoning in the Mills case is more in line with the
purpose of the declaratory judgment acts in general, and more partic-
ularly, with the apparent intent of the drafters of Oklahoma's Declara-
tory Judgment Act. The dissent concluded:
[S]aid Act authorizes District Court actions for declaratoryjudgments clarifying and/or interpreting previous judgments
in civil cases generally. But this is not to say that in such
an action a previous judgment may be changed or modified,
or that rights therein determined or fixed may be redeter-
mined, refixed, or again adjudicated.23
The dissent's conclusion is based on two principal arguments. The
first is that the Oklahoma Declaratory Judgment Act is broader than
the statutes of other states .and, therefore, other states' decisions apply-
ing their statutes cannot be heavily relied on as determinative of the
application of the Oklahoma statute.24 The other is that by use of
certain methods of statutory construction it appears that the Oklahoma
Legislature intended a broader application of Oklahoma's Declaratory
Judgment Act.25
The majority relied on case authority from Arizona and Utah, but
the Oklahoma statute is more broadly drawn. Both the Arizona
and Utah statutes enumerate specific instances in which a declaratory
judgment can be obtained.26 While there is little justification for
defeating the purpose of even these statutes by a narrow reading, there
is no justification for such a reading of the Oklahoma statute. This is
because in the Oklahoma statute the listing of instances in which a de-
claratory judgment can be obtained is preceded by the phrase "included
but not limited to". Professor George Fraser, one of Oklahoma's lead-
23. 512 P.2d at 151 (dissenting opinion).
24. Id. at 154-55 (dissenting opinion).
25. Id.
26. 12 ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1832 (1956), states:
Any person interested under a deed, will, written contract or other writing, or
whose rights, status or legal relations are affected by a statute, municipal ordi-
nance, contract or franchise, may have determined any question of construction
or validity arising under the instrument, statute, ordinance, contract, or fran-
chise and obtain a declaration of rights, status or other legal relations there-
under. A contract may be construed either before or after there has been a
breach thereof.
78 UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-33-2 (1953), states:
Any person interested under a deed, will or written contract, or whose rights,
status or other legal relations are affected by a statute, municipal ordinance,
contract or franchise, may have determined any question of construction or
validity arising under the instrument, statute, ordinance, contract or franchise
and obtain a declaration of rights, status or other legal relations thereunder,
[Vol. 10:281
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ing legal scholars, said with respect to the inclusion of that phrase in
the Oklahoma Declaratory Judgment Act,
Rights and controversies of all kinds may be the subject of
declaratory judgment actions. Seotion 1 of the Oklahoma
act lists certain instruments which may be construed, but this
list is not intended to be complete as indicated by the use
of the phrase 'included but not limited to'.
Not only does the inclusion of this phrase reveal a more broadly drawn
statute, it evinces a legislative intent for a broad application of the
statute. Even though within the Oklahoma statute there is a list of
exceptions to which declaratory judgment cannot be applied, this is
due only to the fact that such exceptions are required by the state
constitution,28 and not to a legislative desire to restrict the applicability
of the act. The dissent in Mills referred to this list of exceptions29
and pointed out that the majority had neglected to apply a familiar
maxim of legislative interpretation, "expressio unius est exclusio al-
terius"39 when it created an additional exception to ,the act's applica-
tion in the Mills case.
Because the Oklahoma Declaratory Judgment Act is remedial,
the dissent could have employed another maxim of statutory construc-
tion-that which calls for the liberal construction of remedial stat-
utes."' This would have been in addition to the Oklahoma statutory
provision specifically providing for liberal construction of statutes.3 2
Professor Fraser recognized the liberal construction to be given the
statute when he stated:
The Uniform Act specifically provides that it shall be 'liber-
ally construed and administered'. This provision was not in-
cluded in the Oklahoma act because our statutes already
provide that all general statutes 'shall be liberally construed
,to promote their object'."
In addition to the above arguments, the dissent should have ex-
plored just what were the reasons for, and what were the policies be-
27. Fraser, Oklahoma's Declaratory Judgment Act, 32 O.B.J. 1447, 1449 (1961),
quoting Ch. 2, § 1, [1961] Okla. Sess. Laws 58 (emphasis supplied).
28. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1657 (1971); Mills v. Mills, 512 P.2d 143, 156 (Okla.
1973).
29. 512 P.2d at 155 (dissenting opinion).
30. Enumerating specific exceptions by the legislature excludes all others and
usually precludes exceptions created by judicial construction.
31. Greer v. Yellow Mfg. Acceptance Corp., 436 P.2d 50 (Okla. 1967).
32. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2 (1971).
33. Fraser, supra note 27, at 145Z quoting UNiFoRM DECLARATORY JUDGMENTs
Acr § 12 and OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2 (1951).
19741
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hind the Declaratory Judgment Act. Did the majority in its holding
support the spirit of, those policies? The answers to these questions
would have provided an even better basis for the dissent.
The logical authority for these answers is Professor Edwin Bor-
chard, a co-draftsman of the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act,
from which, with minor variations, the Oklahoma act is taken. Pro-
fessor Borchard gave fourteen principal functions of the act, and sev-
eral are pertinent to the issue at hand: (1) to make it unnecessary
to disturb the status quo (e.g., breach the contract) as a condition to
bringing a contested issue to litigation; (2) not to force a party to act
upon -his own interpretation of his rights and at his peril as a condition
of judicial action; (3) to eliminate uncertainty from legal relations by
clarifying them; and (4) to enable one to select a mild but sufficient
form of relief instead of the coercive form of relief required in the
past.84  When the decision in -the Mills case is measured against this
background, it can be readily discerned that these functions of the act
were left unfulfilled.
From a practical standpoint, there is a more serious criticism
which can be made of the Mills decision. The court in Mills seemed
to be satisfied in knowing that the plaintiff had remedies alternative
to the declaratory judgment action.35 But a situation could arise
where a party had no relief other than by way of the declaratory judg-
ment. It is to this person that the Oklahoma courts have shut their
doors. Granted, the number of persons in a situation similar to those
in Mills will not be overwhelming, and those without any alternative
relief will be even fewer, but it is unnecessary to deny relief to anyone
where there are no real countervailing policies -to weigh against those
allowing an injured party the relief which he needs. Nothing speaks
louder than the empirical data from -the jurisdictions which allow prior
judgment construction. In those jurisdictions there has been no
"flood of litigation" and there has been no relief denied anyone in
a position to be protected by the declaratory judgment acts.
Finally, the Mills case is contrary to a statement made by Profes-
sor Fraser concerning the use of the Oklahoma Declaratory Judgment
Act. He said, [1n determining rights of the parties, a court may
have to construe a judgment." 6 He obviously anticipated prior judg-
ment construction as a proper subject of the declaratory judgment.
34. E. BORCHARD, supra note 5, at 94-98.
35. But cf. 6A J. MooRE, Fmmu.L PRACtiCE f 57.07, 57.08(3) (2d ed. 1948).
36. Fraser, supra note 26, at 1450.
[Vol. 10:281
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All these considerations militate in favor of the dissent's conclu-
sion that prior judgment construction is a proper application of the
declaratory judgment acts. This conclusion is not only in line with
the purpose and history of the declaratory judgment acts, but it is also
in accord with the weight of authority. A survey of decisions in other
states reveals that a substantial majority" of the states permit the use
of the declaratory judgment for the construction and interpretation of
prior judgments. The federal courts that have considered the question
are unanimous in allowing prior judgment construction. 3  It should
be noted, however, that because the Federal Act39 is broader than the
Uniform Act4" the decisions of state-and federal courts are not pre-
cisely comparable.
Despite the fact that many courts approve the procedure, no clear
test for its application has emerged. The formulation of a test which
37. Meeks v. Town of Hoover, 286 Ala. 373, 240 So. 2d 125 (1970); Talcott
v. Talcott, 54 Cal. App. 2d 743, 129 P.2d 946 (1942); Connecticut Say. Bank v.
First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 133 Conn. 403, 51 A.2d 907 (1947); Koscot Inter-
planetary, Inc. v. State, 230 So. 2d 24 (Fla. Dist. CL App. 1970); Minne v. City of
Mishawaka, 251 Ind. 166, 240 N.E.2d 56 (1968); In re Klages' Estate, - Ia. -,
209 N.W.2d 110 (1973); Stavros v. Bradley, 313 Ky: 676, 232 S.W.2d 1004 (Ct.
App. 1950); Bengtson v. Setterberg, 227 Minn. 337, 35 N.W.2d 623 (1949); Fair-
view Cemetary Perpetual Care Ass'n v. Whitworth, 420 S.W.2d 362 (Mo. Ct. App.
1967); Margaritell v. Township of Caldwell, 58 NJ. Super. 251, 156 A.2d 46 (Super.
Ct. 1959); Burnham v. Bennett, 141 Misc. 514, 252 N.Y.S. 788 (Sup. Ct. 1931);
Beach v. Beach, 57 Ohio App. 294, 13 N.E.2d 581 (1937); Barnes v. Pierce, 36
Tenn. App. 181, 253 S.W.2d 33 (1952); Associated Indem. Corp. v. Wachsmith,
2 Wash. 2d 679, 99 P.2d 420 (1940). Contra, Glassford v. Glassford, 76 Ariz. 220,
262 P.2d 382 (1953); Choate v. Choate, 219 Ga. 250, 132 S.E.2d 671 (1963); Illinois
Power Co. v. Miller, 11 Ill. App. 2d 296, 137 N.E.2d 78 (1956); Crofts v. Crofts, 21
Utah 2d 332, 445 P.2d 701 (1968); Speaker v. Lawler, 463 S.W.2d 741 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1971); But see Lower Colorado River Authority v. McIntyre, 494 S.W.2d 219
(Tex. Civ. App. 1973).
38. Kelso v. Kelso, 225 F.2d 918 (10th Cir. 1955); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Martin,
108 F.2d 824 (8th Cir. 1940); Murrell v. Stock Growers' Nat'l Bank, 74 F.2d 827
(10th Cir. 1934); Board of Comm'rs v. Cockrell, 91 F.2d 412 (5th Cir. 1937), cert.
denied, 302 U.S. 740 (1937); Reliable Machine Works, Inc. v. Unger, 144 F. Supp.
726 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
39. 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1970). "In a case of actual controversy within its juris-
diction, except with respect to Federal taxes, any court of the United States, upon
the filing of an appropriate pleading, may declare the rights and other legal relations
of any interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is or
could be sought. Any such declaration shall have the force and effect of a final judg-
ment or decree and shall be reviewable as such."
40. UNIFORM DECLARATORY JUDGm:ENTS ACT § 2. "Any person interested under
a deed, will, written contract or other writings constituting a contract, or whose rights,
status or other legal relations are affected by a statute, municipal ordinance, contract
or franchise, may have determined any question of construction or validity arising un-
der the instrument, statute, ordinance, contract or franchise and obtain a declaration
of rights, status or other legal relations thereunder."
9
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could be followed in all similar cases -would serve the best interests
of courts, litigants, and lawyers. The Florida Supreme Court has
adopted a test based on Professor Borchard's earlier analysis. Bor-
chard, in his authoritative work on declaratory judgments, was careful
to note that ordinarily a final judgment is not subject to challenge by
a declaratory action, but he acknowledged the propriety of the action
"when an earlier adjudication is -the source of rights or contest, when
it is unclear or ambiguous."141  The Florida test which was adopted
in de Marigny v. de Marigny4" and subsequently followed in Koscot
Interplanetary, Inc. v. State43 echoes these concerns:
The only tenable exception to the rule -that a declaratory
judgment proceeding is not an appropriate method of ques-
tioning a final judgment or decree (valid on the face .of -the
record) is in case the judgment or decree has become the
source of definite rights and is unclear or ambiguous. 44
An intelligent, carefully formulated rule such as that used in Flor-
ida is the proper solution, a solution which both implements and yet
regulates the declaratory judgment action as to prior judgment con-
struction. By requiring that the prior judgment or decree must have
become a source of definite rights, this test meets objections based
on the doctrine of res judicata: there is ,to be no "interpretation"
which would change the rights of the parties. By requiring that the
prior judgment be unclear or ambiguous, -the test guarantees the pres-
ence of an actual controversy. Further, the test places the burden
of meeting these requirements on -the party seeking declaratory relief.
Of course, such a test cannot completely eliminate the possibility of
judicial abuse, but it does provide safeguards and at the very least it
avoids the drastic alternative of eliminating the remedy altogether as
was done by the Oklahoma Supreme Court in the Mills case. Even
with the risk of possible abuse, it seems preferable that courts be re-
quired to clarify ambiguous decrees than that innocent parties be de-
prived of relief. Adherence to an established test, such as that used
in Florida, allows -the action to be used to its fullest and yet holds
its use within proper bounds.
In conclusion, it is hoped that an opportunity will arise in which
the Oklahoma Supreme Court can reconsider the position it took in
41. E. BORCHAma, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS 356 (2d ed. 1941).
42. 43 So. 2d 442 (Fla. 1949).
43. 230 So. 2d 24 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970).
44. 43 So. 2d at 444-45.
[Vol. 10:281
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the Mills case, and that the court will take such opportunity to remove
Oklahoma from that group of states which unnecessarily restrict the
use of their declaratory judgment acts.
11
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